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1.1 Post-truth
Post-truth is a mysterious object that has become part of our epistemologies for
some years now. As often happens, the term was coined to solve a problem,
namely the fact that the distinction between truth and lies, in some contexts and
situations, seems to have become particularly fluid and subtle, up to vanishing
altogether occasionally. True and false would be a whole in which everything is
confused together, depending on the perspective we adopt. Of course, no one
argues that lies should be preferred to the truth, but the concept of truth is
undoubtedly not doing too well given that it was thought useful to add to the
traditional pair of truth and lies a third concept, that of post-truth, which some-
what plays with the idea that there is “something” beyond the truth.
As is known, the function of theories in philosophy is to elaborate hypotheses to
offer arguments in support of an explanation. Now, the fact that theories have been
conceived that, in some way, refer to the concept of post-truth means two things: first,
that the concept of truth, in itself, has seemed to some insufficient to explain the type of
relationship that exists between human beings and the world. Second, that the tradi-
tional concept of truth, which – to be clear – certifies the correspondence between the
human representations of reality and reality itself, has seemed too rigid, too anthropo-
centric, to actually account for the complexity of the real. Therefore – at least ever since
Immanuel Kant – philosophers have begun to formulate the hypothesis that there is
something else, something that is placed beyond what the truth is able to capture.
Is there something beyond the truth? And if so, what is it exactly? It does not
seem easy to answer this question, but the concept of post-truth appears to result
from a certain dissatisfaction about the definitions of truth and lies: a dissatisfac-
tion similar to that which must have driven Kant to introduce the concept of
noumenon next to that of reality. At the other end of the reality of phenomena,
Kant placed something that goes beyond them, pointing at perfection: beyond the
imperfect and partially unknown world in which we find ourselves, beyond what
we construct and organize in that world, there we find the noumenon which is
perfect and complete and which perhaps we will never see or know. Yet, some-
how, we know that it exists and that it has (at least) those characteristics. I think
Kant introduced the noumenon into his theory because of his idea of perfection of
being: in some way, the world had to be better than we know it to be. The
hypothesis of the existence of a noumenal reality expresses this conviction.
The idea of post-truth, at least in its first approximation, on the one hand seems to
react to the Kantian conviction about the perfection of being, on the other hand
seems to radicalize Kant’s skepticism about the possibility of developing true judg-
ments about the knowledge of the external world, or relative to the knowledge of
phenomenal reality. The general thesis is rather simple: since we have reason to doubt
that it is accessible or even that it serves something, we consider the truth a bad telos,
something to which it is not necessary to aspire. Instead, post-truth seems to be, on
the one hand, a more modest and much more realistic objective, on the other hand, a
more useful perspective to organize the sense of reality. In short, if truth is a high and
unrealistic concept, that of post-truth seems to be a more circumscribed, consoling
domain, because it is more accessible and, in some way, ecumenical.
Post-truth is thus a type of truth that is for everyone, because – as we know all
too well – the truth understood in the traditional sense of the adaptation of the
proposition to the thing can be very hard both to achieve and to support. So, a
version of it at everyone’s reach, also suitable for the weaker, less radical, spirits,
can perhaps make us happier, make us feel less inadequate and – most impor-
tantly – open up a world characterized by a plurality of ideas and points of view.
Most of the latter, in the view of post-truth supporters, can aspire to a legitimacy
that is proportional to the rhetorical and polemical vehemence with which they are
expressed. In other words, the more one supports a post-true thesis, the more one
will be able to claim it should be considered true.
That is to say: if we admit that the truth as such does not exist, we must replace it
with individual versions of post-truth. In other words, post-truth becomes the mea-
sure of the fact that in our particular perspective we have placed a meaning in relation
to our life; a meaning that is true for us and only for us or, at most, for those with
whom we share the same perspective. In some ways, the commitment to claim post-
truth is stronger than that to support the truth which, in fact, in many circumstances
speaks for itself. The point, as I will try to show, is this: the post-true perspective has
the objective of debilitating or, if you will, weakening the truth, replacing it in the
name of tolerance, democracy, and respect. Now, these are all very shareable values,
when applied to the practical sphere of human life, but perhaps are less appropriate in
relation to truth. Yet, we often tend to confuse the epistemological and ethical levels.
Finally, according to some hermeneutical philosophies, that of post-truth seems to
be the only domain in which we ought to be interested, because it is a non-ideolo-
gical domain, which consciously rejects the rigor and harshness of any judgment that
claims to be true and therefore definitive and certain.1 The underlying intuition is that
humans should abandon the search for truth as a practice capable of giving them an
identity, simply because each individual corresponds to a particular identity, style, and
character; while, conversely, the truth seems unique, something that must be
achieved and shared and that, sometimes, was even imposed by force.
1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
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1.2 Definition and genealogy
To approach the notion of post-truth and to capture the constellation of meanings
to which it refers, let’s examine the definition of the concept and then go back-
wards, reconstructing the genealogy of the term through the history of ideas.
“Post-truth. Argumentation characterized by a strong appeal to emotionality,
based on widespread beliefs and not on verified facts, which tends to be accepted
as truthful, influencing public opinion”. This is the definition of post-truth that we
find on the Treccani encyclopedia. The Oxford dictionary describes the concept in
much the same way: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and
personal belief”.
The two definitions share more than one element, but mainly the idea that
post-truth involves a strong emotional reaction in relation to what the post-true
judgment is about. In other words, post-truth, more than truth, is emotionally
connoted: emotions help post-truth come into being; we could say that they favor
it. As is known, traditionally, a strong emotional connotation is considered an
element of disturbance to the formulation of true judgments, since emotion is able
to alter the objectivity of the formulation of the judgment. In the case of post-
truth, on the contrary, the emotional connotation would be the most useful ele-
ment to convince people to support post-true opinions.
The second assumption shared by both definitions regards the idea that, in the
domain of post-truth, objective facts have very little weight and, in any case, much
less importance than what we attribute to unfounded opinions. In other words,
the facts that we consider objective as verified are irrelevant. A third assumption
concerns the sphere of influence of post-true judgments and opinions. In fact, the
latter seems to be a very wide sphere indeed. The formulation of post-true judg-
ments, in general, does not concern experts in a certain domain; it rather concerns
non-experts, that is, practically all of us, formulating judgments whose objects are
not things we can claim to be competent in.
To summarize: the formulation of post-true judgments generally depends on
people who are not competent in the area in which they formulate judgments –
which means that, concretely, we are all exposed to the possibility of formulating
post-true judgments. Furthermore, the exposure to post-truth grows along with
the degree of emotionality that characterizes the issues we are dealing with. To be
clear, the more we are dealing with things that concern and involve us, but in
which we are not competent, the higher the risk of formulating post-true obser-
vations or opinions. In essence, therefore, nobody seems to be effectively pro-
tected from the risk of formulating post-true opinions and judgments and,
therefore, from contributing to muddying the waters of truth.
The last element that needs to be emphasized is the necessary link between
truth and post-truth. In both definitions it is possible to speak of post-truth
because, in the final analysis, we are still speaking of truth, or rather because the
concept of truth continues to offer the background of reference. There is a post-
true domain because there is a true domain – at least according to the definitions
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we have seen earlier. So, it seems to be indispensable to clarify what is meant by
truth in order to foster a better understanding of the concept of post-truth.
Truth is one of those concepts that has always run through the history of philoso-
phy. Plato, in the Cratylus, specified that “that speech which says things as they are is
true”2, while Aristotle, in Metaphysics, put forward the very famous definition by
which: “To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is
is, and what is not is not, is true.”3 The Aristotelian definition would later be the
reference of Thomas Aquinas who, as we know, articulated the theory of truth as
adaequatio rei et intellectus, formulated for the first time by the philosopher Isaac Ben
Israeli.4 Post-true judgments are independent of the will to describe things as they
are; the goal of those who formulate them is instead that of constructing a narrative
that presents them to us as we wish, imagine, hope, or fear them to be.
As for the authors of post-true judgments, we must consider at least three cases.
The first is that in which the authors of post-true judgments believe that the for-
mulation of their judgments corresponds to the truth. So, in essence, they end up
mistaking post-truth (opinion, Plato would say) for the truth. Ultimately, they do not
question the truth, nor do they doubt that the truth exists: they simply confuse what
is true with what, at most, is only verisimilar. A second case is given by those who
formulate post-true judgments while being aware that they are post-true judgments
and using them as such. In essence, they lie knowing they are lying and do so for a
purpose. A third case, the most complex and philosophically interesting, is that of
those who believe that there is only post-truth, while truth is a kind of false myth that
philosophy should deconstruct and investigate genealogically. In this case, post-truth
completely replaces truth. Let’s consider the issue in more detail.
1.3 Truth pushed to the edge
One of the tasks traditionally assumed by philosophy is to subject everything to
critical scrutiny, even things that come with reasonable certainty. One of the most
striking examples of this deconstruction is René Descartes’ famous suspicion
towards the existence of the external world, which he developed with increasing
radicality, up to contemplating hypotheses that a person of common sense would
not even dream of formulating. Let us say, Descartes suggests, that what we call
reality is, in fact, a dream.5 After all, we could very well fail to notice the difference
2 Plato, Cratylus in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921),
385b.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tre-
dennick (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann
Ltd. 1933, 1989), IV,7 1011b.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q. 1. a. 1.
5 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes
(Cambridge University Press, 1911). Friedrich Nietzsche’s insight is brilliant in this
respect: “Misconception of Dreams.—In the dream, mankind, in epochs of crude pri-
mitive civilization, thought they were introduced to a second, substantial world: here
we have the source of all metaphysic. Without the dream, men would never have been
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between reality and dream, since it sometimes happens that our dreams have ele-
ments of reality: it does happen that while we dream we mistake the dream for
reality. How can we rule out that this is not always the case and, indeed, that there
is no mysterious entity, perhaps evil, that deceives us systematically, causing us to
confuse dream and wakefulness? If this is the case – and no one, according to the
skeptical argument, can really exclude that it is – then it will be necessary to for-
mulate a theoretical and heuristic hypothesis that addresses the matter. This is one
of Descartes’ fundamental arguments in his Meditations.
It is not easy to deconstruct the skeptical argument because it asserts a possibi-
lity that, as such, cannot be excluded. If we accept, from an epistemological point
of view, the possibility of this paradox, it is not easy to get out of it, or rather it is
not easy to demonstrate that in reality this possibility is only possible (or even
impossible). Common sense has been widely used as a foothold to combat skep-
ticism which, however, cannot be silenced altogether. What common sense can
easily achieve is to show that it is not worthwhile to follow the skeptical path, since
it adds nothing to what we know with some degree of reasonable certainty. On
the other hand, the risks we run if we try to solve the skeptical doubts and take
them seriously are very high: in fact, to do so we should question the minimal core
of knowledge that allows us to dwell in the world and make value judgments.
George Edward Moore was of the idea that through common sense we know
certain things about the world with reasonable certainty, which philosophical
analysis could never find in a better and more convincing way. In essence, there is
no way that philosophy could bring our fundamental knowledge to a higher
degree of certainty. Epistemologists will not be satisfied – as is inevitable – but
ordinary people have no need to justify their knowledge of, say, the existence of
material objects in ways other than those they already know and practice. On the
basis of these intuitions, Moore committed to show the high degree of uncertainty
and implausibility implicit in skeptical arguments, compared to the certainty that
instead accompanies some statements of ordinary language.6 If Tom wants to
show Dick that there are three printing errors on page 11 in his book, what he
should do is go to page 11 and show him the errors, indicating them. In this way,
Dick would see the errors and easily convince himself that there are indeed three
printing errors in that book, on page 11. Moore believes that we must behave in
the same way with regard to the skeptical arguments about the existence of the
external world. Suppose we have to prove the existence of things in the world. It is
enough to show the existence of something in the world – it would not be
necessary to do anything else.
incited to an analysis of the world. Even the distinction between soul and body is
wholly due to the primitive conception of the dream, as also the hypothesis of the
embodied soul, whence the development of all superstition, and also, probably, the
belief in god.” F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr &
Company 1908), § 5.
6 G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, Muirhead Library of Philosophy (London, New
York, Allen and Unwin; Macmillan, 1959), 32–59.
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Some have noted7 that Moore’s argument would leave the skeptic unsatisfied,
since it says nothing about the existence of external objects, but at most argues for
the existence of a certain external object – the book containing the errors on page
11. However, Moore’s purpose is clearly not to follow the skeptic into the folds of
his doubt, but to offer reasons not to get lost in it in the first place, i.e. to escape
that sterile deconstructive path. To put the question differently: is it really con-
venient, in terms of economy of thought, to accept the skeptical doubt? In other
words: given that the goal is knowledge rather than deconstruction, what advan-
tage would skepticism bring? I think this is a legitimate question, whose answer is
the only bulwark we can oppose to the skeptic’s deconstructive drive. There has
been a time in the history of philosophy in which not only the reality of the out-
side world was questioned, but the truth itself began to be viewed with suspicion
and distrust. It has been doubted whether people can access it, partially or com-
pletely, or, more radically, whether it even exists. In other words, some have
questioned whether the world in which we live is the true world, or whether it is
only the product of appearance or deception. Moreover, and more radically, it has
been asked if it made sense to speak of truth. The first question (about the real
world), actually seems paradoxical, at least from the point of view of common
sense. The second, on the very possibility of formulating true judgments, seems
radically absurd since the truth is intrinsic to our way of knowing the world.
Let’s start with the first one. One of the reasons that has led philosophers to
systematically ask the question of truth and to often put it in terms of the rela-
tionship between reality and appearance, translating it into the relationship
between truth and deception, is the suspicion about the limits and fallibility of
sensible knowledge. If we accept the fact that sensitive knowledge is somewhat
problematic and accidental – namely that it can be subject to deception due to
perceptual dysfunctionalities or cognitive errors in the brain’s processing of infor-
mation – then it seems necessary to find some grounds for knowledge that are safe
from the fallibility of the senses.
The senses, moreover, depend largely on one’s species: at a macro level the
information produced by perception is shared, but at a closer look human beings
perceive the world differently from (say) bats, cats, or fish. So, Kant investigated
the modalities of sensible and intellectual knowledge, relativizing them to the
human being. However, after circumscribing the perimeter of human knowledge,
bringing it back to its conditions of possibility, Kant also asserted that what there
is does not coincide with what humans can know. In other words, he hypothe-
sized that there are limits to what we can know and that what lies beyond these
limits – and of which we only have some negative intuition – is somehow more
real, more true, and more consistent than the reality to which we confer meaning
through reason and the senses.
In short, part of Kantian metaphysics is the idea that there is, or may be, a rea-
lity that is more true than the phenomenal reality that we also call true. Now, it is
7 P. A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Open Court Publishing Company, 1999),
397–417.
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evident that this intuition does not make sense if transposed in the terms of
ordinary language, since for the common person it makes no sense to maintain
that there is a reality more real than that in which we live, or to make this reality a
transcendent reality separated from the human one. From the perspective of
common sense, we can hypothesize that there are things that escape our senses
because they are too big or too small or too complex, but in some sense, what is
there is all there is, and it is true.
Kant cautiously circumscribes the domain of what we can know, and limits it to
what can be encountered through our senses and explored through our intellect.
On the other hand, he is also certain that outside of this perimeter there is some-
thing more, which, however, we are destined to know only as a negative limit. We
know that there is something, but we do not know what it is, so we must consider
that limit as a regulatory principle. Kant thus overthrows the traditional framework
long upheld by philosophy, where the episteme prevailed on the doxa, so that the
former was seen as the only area in which it actually makes sense to speak of
knowledge. Rather, Kant circumscribes the scope of possibility to metaphysics,
somehow undermining the ultimate value of knowledge and keeping space for the
truth, while denying that it is a space that human knowledge can access. Essen-
tially, he introduces the idea of a truth circumscribed to the sense domain con-
structed by human beings – therefore, in the final analysis, a truth true to them,
but not absolutely true.
This idea is clearly guided by a principle of prudence, which involves certain
consequences, some desired by Kant himself – above all, the limitation of the
scope of investigation of metaphysics – others, in some way, unforeseen, such as
those produced by the introduction of a concept of truth that declares itself lim-
ited to a specific domain, that of human life. What is true is true, but it is true for
us who know things through senses and categories that work in our typical and
standardized ways. Humans know the world precisely within this domain which
they themselves create in the exact moment they organize it. Prudence, however,
concealed certain dangers that emerged promptly when the Kantian theory was
taken further.
This particular side of Kantianism was drawn on and developed by Friedrich
Nietzsche, who radicalized the subject taking it to extremes and trying to base it
on two distinct levels: physiology and the critique of culture. Once clarified that
only humans care about the truth, since only humans use languages and only
humans exist in the world reflecting on the meaning of their relationship with it,
we can deduce that the truth only exists for humans and relatively to their rela-
tionship with the world. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that, having a meaning
only for us, the truth is relative to our needs, or even depends on those needs.
Therefore, Nietzsche suggests that the truth is nothing other than the outcome of
a strategy aimed at survival. Let me quote here a somewhat long but particularly
meaningful passage, taken from Human, All Too Human:
Metaphysical World.—It is true, there may be a metaphysical world; the abso-
lute possibility of it can scarcely be disputed. We see all things through the
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medium of the human head and we cannot well cut off this head: although
there remains the question what part of the world would be left after it had
been cut off. But that is a purely abstract scientific problem and one not much
calculated to give men uneasiness: yet everything that has heretofore made
metaphysical assumptions valuable, fearful or delightful to men, all that gave
rise to them is passion, error and self deception: the worst systems of knowl-
edge, not the best, pin their tenets of belief thereto. When such methods are
once brought to view as the basis of all existing religions and metaphysics,
they are already discredited. There always remains, however, the possibility
already conceded: but nothing at all can be made out of that, to say not a
word about letting happiness, salvation and life hang upon the threads spun
from such a possibility. Accordingly, nothing could be predicated of the
metaphysical world beyond the fact that it is an elsewhere, another sphere,
inaccessible and incomprehensible to us: it would become a thing of negative
properties. Even were the existence of such a world absolutely established, it
would nevertheless remain incontrovertible that of all kinds of knowledge,
knowledge of such a world would be of least consequence—of even less con-
sequence than knowledge of the chemical analysis of water would be to a
storm tossed mariner.8
So, Nietzsche accepts the Kantian hypothesis: that is, he accepts the idea that there
could be a metaphysical world to which we usually associate a metaphysical truth,
which we know we cannot access. What we call truth is the fruit of the perspective
from which we formulate it, and more precisely, it is the fruit of the structure of
that perspective and of the idea of utility that it expresses. Hence a minimal and
prudent truth which – and this is the point – is the “owl” of post-truth.
1.4 Game over for the truth
Thus, Nietzsche pushes the truth from the edge of metaphysics, where it had
already been relegated by Kant’s decentralization, even further to outside the
realm of philosophy. The way he does so is rather simple. While granting the
possibility of the existence of being in itself, he decisively distances himself from
metaphysics on some specific questions concerning, roughly, the limits and char-
acteristics of human knowledge, the irrelevance of the metaphysical question for
common sense and, finally, for life. In other words, he does not simply claim that
it is true that being is when it is, but goes so far as to affirm that we call true that
which is useful – for us, that is. The revolution initiated by Kant thus becomes
Copernican with Nietzsche. Let’s see the fundamental questions around which it
revolves.
The relativity of perspective. Nietzsche believes that human beings, the only
creatures for which the word “truth” has any meaning, consider the world and the
truth from their own point of view. They can know their point of view and the
8 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 9.
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ways in which it is determined, as well as the conditions that determine it, but they
cannot in any way come out of it, nor can they transcend it. This situation is
immutable: it cannot be changed or corrected. So, we have no way of knowing
what we would know if we were in different conditions. This situation – which is a
fact – makes the metaphysical question about the thing in itself irresolvable: it is
virtually possible that our knowledge is marked by imperfection, typicality, and
incompleteness and we may never notice. This is evidently the skeptical hypoth-
esis, transposed to the question of truth.
The limits of perspective. The knowledge that we usually produce when seeking
the truth is affected by the imperfect components of our humanity: typically, pas-
sions and emotions. All this exposes us to error. We are interested in metaphysics
precisely because of our passion for building worlds: we are passionate about this,
so we create imaginative and false explanations, i.e. fantastic worlds. It should be
noted that, rather curiously, Nietzsche continues to use the distinction between
truth / error / lie in this context, even after having completely dismissed the
truth. He dismisses it by rejecting the hypothesis that it is possible to reach the
truth with the hypothesis that truth is a theoretical construct subordinated to
utility.
We do not and cannot know what is absolutely true, but generally each of us
knows what is useful for them, which may or may not be in agreement with the
utility of the species. So, in the name of survival, reason tricked us into treating
utility as if it were the truth. Therefore, it passed off a circumscribed benefit as
absolute truth. In this context, the task of philosophy consists precisely in
describing this shift in all its significance, so as to take any residual grounds away
from metaphysics. The truth is no longer even a regulative principle: it has turned
into a lie which must be believed so as not to deprive human beings of their pur-
pose. In the long run, however, this “truth” will inevitably come out and reveal
itself as a lie.
The limits of the metaphysical question. For Nietzsche, the question of truth and
the real world, as it is posed by metaphysics, is only relevant to philosophy,
whereas for common sense these are largely secondary questions. The reason for
this lies in utility: the question about the conditions of possibility or knowledge of
the thing in itself does not affect daily life. It could affect the moral sphere, but as
Nietzsche shows, the latter is a typically man-made construct which, significantly,
derives from what humans consider useful for life.
The truth is now completely pushed aside: not only is it a secondary concept,
but it is also false,9 because it is the outcome of manipulation driven by bad con-
science, which transforms utility into reality. This manipulation has disruptive
effects, because the faith in the truth – as Nietzsche says – has given rise to the
most powerful energies. What happens is that we, human animals, only care about
things in their relationship with the human sphere, especially with regard to their
ability to bring pleasure or pain. If we ourselves are the criterion of truth, while
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lying in An Extramoral Sense (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1989).
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the yardstick of judgment is given by utility, it follows that what our species per-
ceives as useful is seen as true. If anyone ever revealed the truth to us, not only
would we not know what to do with it, but we would be deeply disappointed:
Whoever should disclose to us the essence of the world would be undeceiving
us most cruelly. Not the world as thing-in-itself but the world as idea (as
error) is rich in portent, deep, wonderful, carrying happiness and unhappiness
in its womb. This result leads to a philosophy of world negation: which, at any
rate, can be as well combined with a practical world affirmation as with its
opposite.10
As you can see, Nietzsche is deeply interested in the needs of the human being,
and therefore focuses on the question of happiness, creating an ambivalent ten-
sion: if someone revealed to us the essence of the world, if such a thing exists, it
would make us unhappy. Only the lie – which is also infinite freedom, because it
coincides with absolute creativity – gives us a colorful, interpretable world, with
which we can play and create endlessly. This childish creativity towards the truth
also seems to be the only guarantee of happiness. After all, this is the meaning of
the famous aphorism 125 of The Gay Science: “the madman.”11 In Nietzsche’s
view, the madman is such precisely because he has unmasked the most gigantic
deception of metaphysics, namely the existence of God and, as a result of this
unmasking, he tries to tell the world about this fact. The metaphysical world, of
which God’s existence would be a guarantee, provides shelter to human beings,
giving them some form of serenity. However, this comes at a dear price, a price
that we have all paid: human beings are content to live within protective lies, and
the madman pays with madness for his search for the truth.
However, even though Nietzsche dismisses the truth, calling it artisticity and
deception if not even a useless frill, the truth remains there: it is told by the
madman who strives to make it known to all. The madman knows that whoever
hears his story is destined to unhappiness; therefore, he also knows that, to defend
themselves from the truth of his story, his listeners will call him insane. This ten-
sion constitutes the backbone of the whole Nietzschean theory: on the one hand
there is the idea that the real world is a metaphysical construction that has been
developed by humans to defend themselves from the instability of a reality that
they fear and cannot control, and the idea that breaking free from that construc-
tion would allow those who have a strong enough spirit to live in a state of fuller
happiness because they would be more exposed to life, which is all there is.
On the other hand, there is a constant reference to the truth, because saying
that reality is neither captured nor described by the categories of true and false
means to argue against the theoreticians of truth with a specific truth – Nietzsche’s
own truth. There is no way out here, and Nietzsche knew this: any description of
being, however weakened or provisional, refers to a structure, albeit that of a
10 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 29.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), § 125.
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world without structure. Moreover, Nietzsche himself could only draw his con-
clusions by taking the skeptical doubt seriously, in other words, by postulating
that reality may be radically different from how we experience it, because there
may be living beings who experience it and construct it in ways that are totally
different from ours. This could be the case, of course, but there is no evidence that
it is so.
1.5 The effects of the Nietzschean dynamite: the downfall of truth
and the rise of post-truth
“I am no man, I am dynamite”. In fact, the question of truth as Nietzsche inherits
it from Kant and then develops it in his own way is explosive to say the least in
terms of its consequences. Let’s try to recap the theoretical cores of the Nietz-
schean discourse:
1 The push of metaphysics to truth has no reason to exist for two reasons: first,
because even if it existed, the truth expressed in absolute terms would be a
negative concept: something about which, in the final analysis, we cannot
state anything. Second, because the only truth about which we can affirm
something is a truth circumscribed to the domain of the human being, the
only creature for which it makes sense to speak of truth and falsehood.
2 This type of investigation, so dear to philosophers, is absolutely indifferent to
common people, for whom the only perspective that counts is that of utility,
and secondly that of happiness. Therefore, it would be appropriate for philo-
sophers, too, to learn to deal with common sense rather than metaphysics.
3 Since truth in the absolute sense does not exist, it is entirely legitimate for
human beings to take care of their happiness by pursuing their own utility. As
for what kind of utility can convey happiness or at least serenity, Nietzsche
explains it extensively through his genealogical reflections aimed at discussing
the cornerstones of traditional metaphysics: the substantial subject, substance,
and God. Given this gigantic deconstruction of the foundations of reality and
the consequent reworking of the main concepts that make up traditional
ontologies, it is obvious, from the Nietzschean point of view, that happiness
should go through unhappiness – that which derives from the loss of any
object endowed with a comforting function. In these terms, the happiness
that Nietzsche has in mind is something that is only possible for the chosen
spirits – a happiness for the few.
These are the fundamental elements of Nietzsche’s theory. What is most inter-
esting with regard to the discourse about post-truth are the consequences of his
idea of the truth. First of all, it is important to note one point: although Nietzsche
undertakes to deconstruct the idea of truth understood in the traditional sense and
to limit its scope to a very circumscribed area – the human one – the truth remains
in the background as the horizon that makes the Nietzschean reasoning possible.
Nietzsche cannot eliminate the truth: he can weaken it, marginalize it, he can talk
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about its twilight, but he cannot overshadow its light completely. While dismissing
the truth, he tells us that utility and happiness (in the particular sense that
Nietzsche ascribes to the term) are more important than a truth whose power has
been tremendously reduced. If the truth is pushed to the edge of the scene, what
we should focus on is happiness.
Happiness is the core of the concept of post-truth as we understand it today.
Given that truth is not possible, since it may not be possible in absolute terms,
post-truth is there to make us, or allow us to be, happy, though not in Nietzsche’s
terms.12 Nietzsche’s conception of happiness was extremely burdensome: he dis-
missed the truth, but he made happiness something extremely demanding – prac-
tically elitist. His model of happiness required commitment to shape one’s
character, to control one’s instincts, to forge one’s will: a work that has an ascetic
aspect and that has a certain idea of human perfection as its natural telos. The idea
that it is legitimate to replace truth with utility and happiness is inherently pro-
blematic and full of implications, but Nietzsche somehow limited the con-
sequences of it – at least those implied by his theory – by proposing an ethics of
self-improvement that preserves the ideal of the human being, although it too is
full of consequences (many of which are questionable).
If, however, we redefine happiness in less demanding terms than those that
Nietzsche had in mind and bring it down to common sense – the same common
sense that is generally the focus of politics when it comes to creating consensus –
then the formulation of post-true judgments implies the adoption of absolutely
individualistic criteria that are tailored to the happiness of those who formulate the
post-true judgment. The domain of post-truth is not aimed at the truth: it is
content with a modest utility which, moreover, is functional to the achievement of
an equally modest happiness. Its core is equality – any judgment has equal legiti-
macy as long as it is useful to those who formulate it. Still Nietzsche, somewhat
paradoxically, captures well the mediocre nature of this typicalization:
Now, the great majority of mankind endure life without any great protest, and
believe, to this extent, in the value of existence, but that is because each
individual decides and determines alone, and never comes out of his own
personality like these exceptions: everything outside of the personal has no
existence for them or at the utmost is observed as but a faint shadow. Con-
sequently the value of life for the generality of mankind consists simply in the
fact that the individual attaches more importance to himself than he does to
the world.13
12 Here’s an example: “What I wish for those men who are of any concern to me at all is
that they experience suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment and indignities—that
profound self-contempt, the torment of self-distrust and the misery of the vanquished
not remain unknown to them: I have no pity for them because I wish them the only
thing which can prove today whether one has any value or not—that he stands firm.”
Nietzsche, The Will to Power (London, Penguin, 2017), § 910.
13 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, § 33.
12 Tiziana Andina
In this further stretch of his theory, Nietzsche recalls a doctor prescribing a cure
while knowing very well what side effects it will present.
In post-truth, any judgment should be heard and legitimized simply because it
has been formulated. Therefore, the best-formulated post-true judgments are
those that are rhetorically more effective and arouse emotions capable of making
them incisive. There are two objections, in my opinion decisive, to the two ver-
sions of the post-truth theory, namely the Nietzschean, broader variant and
today’s one, which is a less refined and less noble subspecies of the former. The
first is a sort of diffused mist that permeates a universe in which everything has the
same legitimacy. In the mist, the coordinates are lost and we lose direction even
more than in the dark. The second is that the post-true world will not produce a
better humanity: on the contrary it will produce a second-rate humanity, one for
which nothing matters except one’s own happiness. Nietzsche had a vague suspi-
cion, a presentiment, that this could happen: in a world where everything has the
same value – the value that each of us give it – we need Baron Münchhausen’s
initiative not to sink in the swamp.
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